Euthanasia: Continuing the Conversion by Cahill, Lisa Sowle
The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 48 | Number 3 Article 8
August 1981
Euthanasia: Continuing the Conversion
Lisa Sowle Cahill
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Cahill, Lisa Sowle (1981) "Euthanasia: Continuing the Conversion," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol. 48: No. 3, Article 8.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol48/iss3/8
" 
Euthanasia: Continuing the Conversion 
Lisa Sowle Cahill 
The author is an assistant professor in the department of theology 
at Boston College. She has contributed several articles to Linacre in 
the past. 
There continues to appear in the Linacre Quarterly evidence of 
lively interest in debating the possible justifiability of direct eutha-
nasia. Judging by his recent article, Richard Sherlock (5/80) even 
considers my own contribution to that discussion (2/77; 11 /77) to be 
worthy of further attention. I appreciate his constructive criticism of 
my suggestion that euthanasia might be morally legitimate in some 
rare cases, as I have been of the previous responses of Profs. James G. 
Colbert (8/77; 5/78) and Robert J . Comiskey (5/77). It might none-
theless be helpful to clarify a few points with regard to which there 
may be some misunderstanding. 
First, I would concur with Sherlock that there is no private realm in 
which agents bear no responsibility for the effects of their actions on 
the common good. By indicating (e.g., in response to Comiskey) that 
there is a distinction between the question of the moral justifiability 
of euthanasia and that of public policy regarding it, I meant only to 
suggest that the acts of individuals and public policies may have 
different impacts on the common good, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. The question of prudent legislation generally is related to but 
distinct from that of the morality of the sorts of acts which the law 
regards. To take a less controversial illustration, most would agree that 
it is morally acceptable to refuse or withhold life-prolonging treatment 
under certain conditions. Yet, even among those who grant this pos-
sibility, there is discussion of whether it would be prudent or 
imprudent to make the " Living Will" a legally binding document. 
Would legislation enforcing the Living Will lead to more abuses than it 
would prevent, or would the opposite be true? To conclude that it is 
preferable to leave adherence to Living Wills to the discretion of 
family members and medical staff is not to say that decisions about 
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prolonging the lives of terminally ill patients have no impact on the 
common good, but only that any additional impact which might be 
had by general laws regarding these decisions ought to be considered 
prudently before the laws are enacted. Thus, even though I would in 
principle justify exceptional instances of euthanasia, I would at least 
hesitate before recommending that family, physicians, etc., ought to 
be legally protected in their performance of such acts. This is a ques-
tion which bears further discussion. 
Second, Sherlock clarifies the fact that Thomas Aquinas (to whom I 
appealed in support of my original argument) rejects suicide, of which 
voluntary euthanasia can be considered a subcategory. I have not 
intentionally suggested the contrary. However, I would say that 
although suicide in general is rejected by Thomas, direct killing of the 
innocent in certain narrowly defined cases, not explicitly considered 
by Thomas, is not inconsistent with his general principles. In partic-
ular, I think some relevant premises of Thomistic ethics are that 
human nature is characterized by rationality and freedom, that the 
highest goods for persons are spiritual goods, that the only "absolute" 
is God, and that the only evil "absolutely" prohibited is moral evil or 
sin, a deliberate turning away from God. My basic argument is that 
while the killing of the innocent is usually, even almost always, a sin, 
it may not be a sin without exception if a good even higher than life is 
at stake. (This, of course, is not to claim that Thomas himself would 
agree with the way I have interpreted " Thomistic" principles or 
applied them to the case at hand.) 
To reply a little differently, I do not think that the fact that 
Thomas prohibits suicide necessarily entails that he considers life an 
"absolute," as suggested by Sherlock and Colbert. I would define an 
"absolute" as something which must be sought absolutely, something 
which commands human effort unconditionally, in any and all circum-
stances, whatever other goods are at stake. At least as far as I can 
determine, "life" in the temporal and physiological sense has never 
been an absolute in the Christian tradition. This is apparent from the 
fact that the duty to preserve life always has been a limited one. Thus 
I judge that Thomas's rejection of suicide is not equivalent to his 
absolutizing of life. Rather, it is a statement about what means may 
legitimately be used to terminate life, or what the justifying reasons 
for causing death might be. My difference with the specific conclu-
sions drawn in the Summa Theologiae (II-II, Q. 64, a. 5) are on this 
level (can direct killing ever be a justifiable means of bringing about 
death of an "innocent" patient? For what cause?) rather than on the 
issue of whether life is an "absolute." 
Thirdly, I would like to distance myself from any equation or 
confusion of a "quality of life" standard with a "social usefulness" 
standard, whether for withdrawing treatment or for direct euthanasia. 
I consider this a most important point, and one which needs to be 
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brought to the foreground of this series of exchanges. To say that 
continued physical existence is no longer of appreciable value to the 
patient is not to say that the patient is no longer of any value, or no 
longer has the dignity which makes his or her interests and rights 
(including life) worthy of perfection. Rather, it is to ask what action is 
now in the best interest and most protective of the dignity of this 
individual. This distinction is one which, following Richard 
McCormick, I have made and repeated before. I would say that the 
very possibility of deciding to discontinue life support (to withdraw 
"extraordinary means") depends on the possibility of making such a 
decision. In some cases, it becomes necessary to decide whether con-
tinued life really is in keeping with the dignity and interests of a cer-
tain patient. This does not strike me as an area of particular contro-
versy. The real controversy is over whether direct killing can ever be 
an acceptable means of seeking death. 
It seems neither necessary nor usually justifiable to say that those 
who argue (like myself and McCormick) that continued life is some-
times not "worthwhile" to the patient, are also arguing that the 
person in question no longer has dignity and "worth" in himself or 
herself, or even (quite secondarily), to others. I take it that Pope Pius 
XII is making the same point in "The Prolongation of Life," i.e., that 
life can at some point cease to be of sufficient quality, judged from 
the patient's point of view, to ground an obligation to preserve it. He 
amplifies his statement that it is obligatory only to use "ordinary" 
means because "a more strict obligation would be too burdensome," 
by adding that "life, health, all temporal activities are in fact subordi-
nated to spiritual ends" (The Pope Speaks 4 [1957], p. 394). Pope 
Pius, of course, never would have allowed that direct killing could be a 
licit means of terminating life. That is where I am making a departure 
and a different argument, one which must be considered on its own 
merits, not on the merits of utilitarian evaluations of the protection 
due the terminally or chronically ill. 
Although I have expressed reservations about certain interpretations 
of my article, I remain receptive to colleagues such as Colbert, 
Comiskey, and Sherlock who are willing to engage in conversation 
about this very serious issue, and am open to criticisms or refinements 
of my own position. The familiar observation of St. Thomas, that 
"although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we 
descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter 
defects" (ST, I-II, Q. 94, a. 4), continues to inspire succeeding genera-
tions of ethicists to proceed in a modest and irenic frame of mind. 
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